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Abstract
The government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality,
boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of
two incentive policies, namely (1) incentive on manufacturer’s R&D investment and (2) direct incentive to consumer based
on greening level of the product on the optimal pricing and investment decisions in improving used product return and
greening level decisions in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). Optimal decisions are derived under manufacturer and
retailer-Stackelberg games, and results are compared to explore characteristics of optimal decisions, consumer surplus, and
environmental improvement under two marketing strategies of a manufacturer. It is found that the greening level and used
product return rate in a CLSC are always higher under retailer-Stackelberg game. If the manufacturer sets a target for
greening level, the CLSC members may receive higher profits if consumer receives incentive because of higher consumer
surplus. However, environmental improvement may be lower. If the manufacturer sets a product return goal, then CLSC
members may compromise with consumer surplus or environmental improvement for receiving higher profits. In the
presence of direct incentive to consumers, CLSC members can trade with product at lower greening level for higher profits.
Moreover, investment in improving used product return is always less compared to the investment in improving greening
level.
Keywords Closed-loop supply chain  Government incentives  Remanufacturing  Stackelberg game
Introduction
Due to environmental awareness, government regulations,
and economical benefits of product remanufacturing/recy-
cling, closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management
emerges as one of the leading research interests from
marketing and supply chain management researchers
(Savaskan et al. 2004; Jayaraman 2006; Kumar and
Putnam 2008; Yuan and Gao 2010; Chen and Chang 2012;
Hong et al. 2013; Huang et al. 2013; De Giovanni and
Zaccour 2014; Gao et al. 2016; Tighazoui et al. 2019). In a
CLSC, products move from the manufacturer to the con-
sumers in forward supply chain, while the reverse supply
chain involves the movement of used products from con-
sumers for remanufacturing. Manufacturers employ dif-
ferent measures such as raw material selection during
product development, reconstruction of process for recy-
cling, employees training, and consumer awareness pro-
gramme, provide monetary reward or exchange offer, etc.,
for remanufacturing. For example, Xerox corporation is
using advanced technologies to produce waste-free prod-
ucts and collects millions of cartridges for remanufacturing
or reuse. The initiatives not only ensure monetary benefit
over $127 million, but also help the company to save over
115 million pounds of greenhouse gasses.1 In 2016,
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Hewlett-Packard launched recycling initiatives to collect
hardware in collaboration with Best Buy stores and recy-
cled 3200 tonnes plastic resin to develop product such as
HP ENVY Photo 6200, 7100, and 7800 printers.2 Apple
designed their global supply chain facilities by clean
energy and archived the goal ‘‘100% renewable is 100%
doable.’’3 Government organizations also encourage
remanufacturing activities by providing incentives under
various policies. One can identify different forms of
incentive which are implemented in different countries. For
example, the Florida Department of Environmental Pro-
tection, a leading agency for environmental management,
encourages remanufacturing through different policies such
as Recycling Loan Program, Household Hazardous Waste
Grants, and Innovative Recycling/ Waste Reduction
Grants.4 The government of UK announced a businesses
support programme of £4 million to encourage ‘‘circular
economy’’ approaches to improve recycling processes,
innovations that encourage people to change behavior and
reduce plastic waste.5 The government of New Zealand
provided support through ‘‘Waste Minimization Fund’’ to
encourage resource efficiency, reuse, recovery, and recy-
cling and reduce waste to landfill.6 Government of India
introduced ‘‘UJALA programme’’7 and provided incentive
up to 50% of unit cost of 20W LED and 40% of BEE 5-star
rated energy-efficient fans directly to consumers. The
government estimated that the initiative can annually save
79 million tonnes of CO2 gas emission. Iino and Lim
(2010) reported that the government of Japan introduced
‘‘Eco Car Subsidy Policy’’ to encourage the replacement of
aged vehicles with better environmental performance
standards on popular car model and provided tax incentive
up to 10% of the vehicle’s price. The evidence of gov-
ernment incentives can also be obtained in different market
segments such as energy-efficient home appliances (Yu
et al. 2018), energy-efficient lighting (Harder and Beard
2016), and electric or hybrid plug-in vehicles in several
countries (Yang et al. 2016). However, the effects of dif-
ferent government incentive polices on the optimal deci-
sions of a CLSC are not explored explicitly. In addition, if
manufacturers have options, it is necessary to explore the
characteristics of optimal decisions by considering various
marketing goals or operational barriers. Therefore, this
study conducts a comparative analysis for the selection of
optimal incentive policy in the perspective of remanufac-
turing and environmental sustainability.
In the literature, researchers made continuous efforts to
explore optimal pricing and investment decision in
improving greening level and encouraging used product
return for remanufacturing in different scenarios (Govindan
et al. 2015). However, based on our knowledge, no ana-
lytical study in CLSC setting was made to investigate
characteristics of optimal decisions under joint influence of
marketing or operational strategies of manufacturer in the
presence of government incentive policies. We analyze the
effects of two incentive policies: government incentive on
total R&D investment (Policy T) and direct consumer
incentives (Policy C). The main objective of our study is to
find the answers of the following questions:
• which policy will assure maximum profits for the CLSC
members?
• what are the impacts of two incentive policies on
greening level (GL) of the product and used product
return rate?
• how do incentive policies affect the consumer surplus
(CS) and environmental improvement (EI)?
• and, if the manufacturer has a marketing goal or faces
issues related to implementation of green technology,
does the preference of the manufacturer change
according to power structure of CLSC members?
To find answers to the above questions, this study considers
two game structures and two incentive policies. Our analysis
leads to the following main results: irrespective of whether
the manufacturer is receiving incentives from the govern-
ment, GL and return rate are always higher in retailer-
Stackelberg (RS) game. In a pragmatic scenario, the objective
of CLSC members may not be concurrent with the govern-
ment. The profits of each CLSC member increase with gov-
ernment incentive, but GL may not. If the manufacturer
bounds to set target for GL, each member of CLSC receives
higher profits under incentive Policy C. Used product return
rate and CS are also higher under this policy. When the
manufacturer sets a remanufacturing goal, under the manu-
facturer Stackelberg (MS) game, the retailer receives uniform
profits under both incentive policies. CLSC members may
prefer incentive Policy C, which can lead to inferior outcomes
in perspective of GL and EI.
Literature review
This study is largely concerned with governments incentive
and game structure in CLSC, and the literature on price-
and GL-sensitive demand. In the following paragraphs, we
discuss two important topics in the literature to highlight
the motivation and importance of this study.
2 www8.hp.com/h20195/v2/GetPDF.aspx/c05968415.pdf.
3 www.apple.com/lae/environment/.
4 https://floridadep.gov/waste/waste-reduction/content/recycling-
grants-and-loans.
5 www.gov.uk/government/news/reducing-plastic-waste-in-the-envir
onment-apply-for-funding.
6 www.mfe.govt.nz/more/funding.
7 http://vikaspedia.in/energy/policy-support/energy-efficiency/domes
tic-efficient-lighting-programme-delp.
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CLSC management is one of the great interests in both
business and academic research due to growing consumer
awareness on environmental issues and regulations. It is
difficult to ignore the influence of government organiza-
tions in CLSC. Government regulatory agencies not only
set the rules for trading/remanufacturing goods and regu-
late environmental impact such as emissions, and waste
disposal, but encourage remanufacturing by providing
incentives also. However, the literature is scanty on gov-
ernment’s incentive policy in CLSC. Mitra and Webster
(2008) explored the effect of government subsidies on the
retail price competition between new and remanufactured
products. The authors found that the profits earned by the
manufacturer through the remanufacturing activity reduce
significantly as the amount of government incentive
increases. Ma et al. (2013) studied the impact of govern-
ment consumption subsidy on a dual-channel CLSC. The
authors found that the bricks mortar retailer always
receives higher profits under the government subsidy,
whereas benefits of e-retailer largely depend on system
parameters. Wang et al. (2014) conducted an empirical
investigation to compare the effect of government incen-
tive on R&D investment and production quantity in the
context of Chinese recycling and remanufacturing industry.
Through simulation experiment, the authors found that the
production subsidy could control the quantity of remanu-
factured products and keep the stability of remanufacturing
industry. Heydari et al. (2017) studied the impact of tax
exemptions or subsidies on a two-echelon CLSC and found
that the government intervention can increase the number
of remanufactured products. Shu et al. (2017) compared
optimal pricing and remanufacturing decision under the
government’s tax rebate policy and remanufacturing
incentive. The authors found that trade-in subsidy always
stimulates remanufacturing. Jena et al. (2018) studied a
CLSC consist with two manufacturers and a common
retailer and found that return rate of used product and the
individual profit of participating member increases with the
government incentive. However, the above-cited literature
did not consider the impact of investment decisions by
correlating marketing goals or explore the effects of dif-
ferent incentive policies on EI in different game structures.
A large body of the literature has dealt with CLSC
models under different game structures in absence of
government incentive. Hong et al. (2013) developed
Stackelberg game models to investigate a CLSC composed
of a manufacturer and an independent retailer, or a man-
ufacturer, a retailer, and a third party with price and
advertisement-level-dependent demand. The authors found
that the cooperative advertisement fails to coordinate the
CLSC. Wei et al. (2015) studied a CLSC model with
symmetric and asymmetric information structures and used
game theory in order to investigate how the manufacturer
and retailer make their individual pricing decisions and
return rate. Guo and Gao (2015) studied the optimal
recycling production strategy in a CLSC by considering
constant demand. The authors assumed the recycling rate,
buyback, and remanufacturing cost as exponential distri-
bution functions. Taleizadeh et al. (2016) studied the
influence of two-part tariff on a dual-channel CLSC. The
authors found that the supply chain member could receive
higher profit if the manufacturer invests in both marketing
effort and advertising itself. Gao et al. (2016) explored the
characteristics of a CLSC under different power structures
on the optimal decisions and performance of overall supply
chain. Saha et al. (2016) explored the characteristics of a
CLSC under reward-driven remanufacturing policy. The
authors found that the consumers receive maximum reward
if the manufacturer directly collects the product. Modak
et al. (2016) discussed collusion behavior in a CLSC with a
manufacturer and duopolies retailers and employed cost
sharing contract mechanism for coordination. Genc and De
(2017) developed a two-period MS game model for a
CLSC in which the return rate of the product is a function
of both price and quality and consumers look for most
possible gain from their returns. Taleizadeh et al. (2018)
investigated pricing, product quality, and used product
return rate decisions of the manufacturer, retailer, and third
party under dual recycling. Alamdar et al. (2018) investi-
gated pricing, product return, and sales effort decisions in a
three-level CLSC under fuzzy environment. The authors
proved that collaboration between CLSC members
improves the profits of each member.
In this study, we explore the behavior of optimal deci-
sions of a CLSC under price- and GL-sensitive demand.
The increase in consumer awareness toward environmental
issues, it is necessary to determine optimal GL. Perhaps,
Ghosh and Shah (2012) introduced first analytical model
under price- and GL-sensitive demand. The authors
employed cost and revenue-sharing contract in the per-
spective of achieving supply chain coordination. In a
similar study, Ghosh and Shah (2015) showed that the
manufacturer can able to produce products with a higher
GL if the retailer offers a R&D-cost-sharing contract.
Swami and Shah (2013) extended the study and showed
that the two-part tariff contract between the supply chain
members could reduce channel conflict. Li et al. (2016)
analyzed dual-channel green supply chain where the
manufacturers produce eco-friendly products in both cen-
tralized and decentralized frameworks. The authors showed
that the manufacturer’s decision to open a direct channel is
directly related to GL of the product. Basiri and Heydari
(2017) added another important dimension as sales effort
and formulated an analytical model to study the impact of
substitutable green products. The authors showed that the
manufacturer could always trade with the product at
Journal of Industrial Engineering International (2019) 15 (Suppl 1):S291–S308 S293
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superior GL under the cooperative environment. Song and
Gao (2018) introduced two contract mechanisms and
proved that a retailer-led revenue-sharing contract always
improves profits of each participating member, but the
retailer always receives less amount of profit under a bar-
gaining revenue-sharing contract. Dey et al. (2018) also
proved that the manufacturer decision to produce devel-
opment or marginal-cost sensitive green product is highly
correlated with the retailer inventory carrying decision. In
this direction, the recent work of Li et al. (2016), Dai et al.
(2017), Yang and Xiao (2017), Ghosh et al. (2018), Patra
(2018), Dey and Saha (2018), Jamali and Rasti-Barzoki
(2018) and Nielsen et al. (2019a) is worth mentioning.
However, in a CLSC, the manufacturer needs to invest both
in R&D to improve GL and marketing effort to encourage
recycling. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the nature of
investment patterns of a manufacturer under a CLSC.
Problem description
We consider a bilateral monopoly in a CLSC with a single
retailer and a single manufacturer under MS and RS games.
The manufacturer produces a green product and sells
through an independent retailer. We consider two types of
incentive policies and two game structures and conse-
quently analyze six different scenarios. We represent sce-
narios by ij, where i ¼ M;R represents the MS (M) and RS
(R) games and j ¼ T;C;N represents inventive on total
R&D investment (T), direct incentive to consumer (C), and
benchmark no-incentive case (N). The manufacturer
directly collects the used product from consumers. The
following assumptions are made to formulate analytical
models:
1. The market demand faced by the retailer is linearly
dependent on the retail price (p) and GL (h). Similar to
Yang and Xiao (2017), Song and Gao (2018) and Dey
and Saha (2018), the functional from of market
demand is assumed as D ¼ a bpþ bh, where a, b,
and b represent market potential, price, and GL
sensitivity of consumers, respectively. Green innova-
tion cost is considered as kh2 to ensure that a higher
investment is needed to produce products at higher GL.
Furthermore, notice that this assumption is common in
the literature, such as in Ghosh and Shah 2015; Li et al.
2016; Dey et al. 2018; Nielsen et al. 2019b.
2. The unit manufacturing and remanufacturing costs are
considered as cm and cr, respectively. All the return
products have same manufacturing cost, and unit
manufacturing cost is higher than remanufacturing
cost, i.e., cr\cm (Savaskan et al. 2004; Taleizadeh
et al. 2018). The total investment of collection CLðs; aÞ
for the manufacturer is considered as
CLðs; aÞ ¼ asDþ js2, where j[ 0 and a[ 0, respec-
tively, represent the scaling parameter (Savaskan et al.
2004; Jena et al. 2018). Therefore, the consumer
receives $a per unit from the manufacturer by returning
the product and s; 0 s 1 represents the used product
return rate.
3. A fraction d of remanufactured products converts into
same quality to the new product and sold as new one
(Gao et al. 2016; Taleizadeh et al. 2018). Similar to the
works in Saha et al. (2016), Alamdar et al. (2018),
Sinayi and Rasti-Barzoki (2018), and Taleizadeh et al.
(2019), the effect of logistics costs in forward and
reverse supply chain between manufacturer to cus-
tomers is also normalized to zero to improve the clarity
of the analytical findings. The manufacturer sells the
rest of the products in secondary market with a price of
ws. The CLSC decisions are taken in a single-period
setting (Guo et al. 2018). The manufacturer is respon-
sible for the used product collection in remanufactur-
ing. The real examples of the model are televisions and
digital cameras of Samsung, fashion accessories brand
like H&M, Zara, etc. (Martin 2019).
4. The impact of two government incentive policies is
analyzed. In Policy T, the manufacturer receives
incentives from the government on the total R&D
investment (Nam 2012; Liu and Xia 2018). Therefore,
the contribution from the government is ckh2,
(0\c\1). For example, in Japan, Ministry of Envi-
ronment approves 5 billion yen in 2019 as subsidy for
the manufacturer to cover 33 to 50% of their equipment
price to produce products with biodegradable bioplas-
tics (https://bioplasticsnews.com/2018/08/27/japan-gov
ernment-bioplastics/ ). Through Technology & Quality
Upgradation Support scheme for MSMEs (TEQUP),
government of India provides subsidy upto 25% of the
project cost for implementation of energy-efficient
technology (www.standupmitra.in/Home/Subsidy
SchemesForAll). In Policy C, the government provides
incentives directly to consumer based on the GL of the
product. If the government provides subsidy q0 þ qh,
then the price paid by the consumer to the retailer will
be p ðq0 þ qhÞ. The similar incentive policy is
studied by the researches (Chu et al. 2018; Sinayi and
Rasti-Barzoki 2018) in the existing literature if q ¼ 0.
However, green purchasing decision and amount of
incentives depend on GL of the product (Mannberg
et al. 2014; Houde and Aldy 2014). For example,
government of China offered a per unit fixed amount of
¥31,500 for purchasing of plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles with electric range of 50 km or more. The
subsidy amount increased ¥54,000, ¥45,000, and
S294 Journal of Industrial Engineering International (2019) 15 (Suppl 1):S291–S308
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¥31,500 for the vehicles with battery capacity range of
250 km or higher, 150–250 km, and 80–150 km,
respectively (www.evpartner.com/news/27/detail-
13412.html). Similar evidence also reported by Zheng
et al. (2018), where government of China implemented
incremental incentive policy to consumers in various
provinces. Therefore, it is necessary to explore char-
acteristics of optimal decisions if the amount of
incentive varies with GL.
5. The Stackelberg game approach is employed to derive
the optimum decisions. Under MS and RS games, the
decision sequence is defined as follows:
Step 1: In MS game, the manufacturer decides
wjm, h
j
m, and s
j
m. In RS game, the retailer
decides profit margin mjr ¼ pjr  wjr;
Step 2: In MS game, the retailer decides retail
price pjm. In RS game, the manufacturer
decides wjr, h
j
r, and s
j
r.
According to the backward solution,
anticipating the follower’s response, the
Stackelberg leader optimizes his/her own
decision variables (Taleizadeh et al.
2019).
The following notations are used for developing models
under different scenarios:
w
j
i
Unit wholesale price (decision variable)
p
j
i
Unit retail price (decision variable)
sji Return rate of used products from the customer (decision
variable)
hji Level of green innovation (decision variable)
p jmi Profit of the manufacturer
p jri Profit of the retailer
Q
j
i
Sales volume
Model
In this section, we present the profit structures for CLSC
members and explore characteristics of optimal decisions.
Optimal decisions under incentive Policy T
The manufacturer produces the green product at a manu-
facturing cost of cm and sells the product with GL h
T
m to the
retailer at a wholesale price wTm. The retailer sells it to the
customers at a price of pTm. The manufacturer collects used
product from the consumers by paying a per unit. Only a
portion d has same quality with the new one with GL hTm,
and the remaining portion are sold in the secondary market
with a price of ws. The profit functions for the retailer and
manufacturer in Scenario MT are obtained as follows:
pTrmðpTmÞ ¼ ðpTm  wTmÞða bpTm þ bh
T
mÞ ð1Þ
pTmmðwTm; h
T
m; s
T
mÞ ¼ ðwTm  cmÞða bpTm þ bh
T
mÞ
þ ðcmdþ wsð1  dÞ  a crÞ
sTmða bpTm þ bhTmÞ
 jsTm
2  ð1  cÞkhTm
2
ð2Þ
In MS game, the manufacturer first decides GL (hTm), return
rate (sTm), and wholesale price (w
T
m); then, the retailer sets
retail price (pTm). However, under RS game the retailer sets
retail price (pTr ) first, and then, the manufacturer decides
GL (hTr ), return rate (s
T
r ), and wholesale price (w
T
r ). The
following two propositions represent the optimal decisions
in Scenarios MT and RT, respectively.
Proposition 1 Under MS game, optimal decisions in
Policy T are obtained as follows:
wTm ¼
ð4ðaþ bcmÞð1  cÞk cmb2Þj abð1  cÞM2k
D1
;
pTm ¼
að1  cÞð6j bM2Þkþ ð2bð1  cÞk b2Þcmj
D1
;
hTm ¼
ða bcmÞbj
D1
; sTm ¼
ða bcmÞð1  cÞbMk
D1
;
pTrm ¼
4ða bcmÞ2ð1  cÞ2bk2j2
D1
2
;
pTmm ¼
ða bcmÞ2ð1  cÞkj
D1
;
QTm ¼
2ða bcmÞð1  cÞbkj
D1
:
where D1 ¼ bð1  cÞkð8j bM2Þ  b2j and M ¼ ðcmdþ
wsð1  dÞ  cr  aÞ.
Proof Please see ‘‘Appendix 1.’’ h
Proposition 2 Under RS game, optimal decisions in Policy
T are obtained as follows:
wTr ¼
2ððaþ 3bcmÞð1  cÞk cmb2Þj ðaþ bcmÞð1  cÞbM2k
2D2
;
pTr ¼
að2bð1  cÞð3j bM2Þk b2jÞ þ ð2bð1  cÞk b2Þbcmj
2D2
;
hTr ¼
ða bcmÞbj
2D2
; sTr ¼
ða bcmÞð1  cÞbMk
2D2
;
pTrr ¼
ða bcmÞ2ð1  cÞkj
2D2
; pTmr ¼
ða bcmÞ2ð1  cÞkj
4D2
;
QTr ¼
ða bcmÞð1  cÞbkj
D2
:
Journal of Industrial Engineering International (2019) 15 (Suppl 1):S291–S308 S295
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where D2 ¼ bð1  cÞkð4j bM2Þ  b2j
Proof Please see ‘‘Appendix 2.’’
Optimal solutions exist under Scenarios MT and RT if
Dl [ 0, l ¼ 1; 2, which implies 4j[ bM2. Substituting c ¼
0 in Equations (1) and (2), one can find the profit functions
for the Scenarios MN or RN, where government does not
provide any incentives. We present the optimal decisions
under two game structures in ‘‘Appendix 3,’’ because the
expressions are similar to Propositions 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Government incentives encourage the manufacturer
to produce product with a higher GL and promote recycling
because
ohTm
oc ¼
ðabcmÞð8jbM2Þbbkj
D1
2 [ 0,
osTm
oc ¼
ðabcmÞbMb2kj
D1
2
[ 0, oh
T
r
oc ¼
ðabcmÞð4jbM2Þbbkj
2D2
2 [ 0, and
osTr
oc ¼
ðabcmÞbMb2kj
2D2
2
[ 0, respectively. Under the influence of government
incentive, the manufacturer has more flexibility to invest in
improving GL and accelerating used return rate. Results
justify the fact. We propose the following theorem to
explore behavior of optimal decisions under two game
structures. h
Theorem 1 Under incentive Policy T,
(1) the GL of the product is higher in RS game
(2) the return rate is higher in RS game
(3) consumers need to pay more in MS game compared
to RS game if k[ b
2
2bð1cÞ
(4) the manufacturer and retailer receive higher profits
under their respective leadership.
Proof The following inequalities ensure the proof:
hTr  h
T
m ¼
ða bcmÞðb2jþ b2M2ð1  cÞkÞbj
2D1D2
[ 0
sTr  sTm ¼
ða bcmÞðb2jþ b2M2ð1  cÞkÞbMð1  cÞ
2D1D2
[ 0
pTm  pTr ¼
ða bcmÞð2bð1  cÞk b2Þðb2jþ b2M2ð1  cÞkÞj
2D1D2
[ 0
if k[
b2
2bð1  cÞ
pTrr  pTrm ¼
ða bcmÞ2ðD12 þ 8b2ð1  cÞ2ð4j2  bM2jÞk2Þð1  cÞjk
2D1D2
[ 0
pTmm  pTmr ¼
ða bcmÞ2ð3D2  4bð1  cÞjkÞð1  cÞjk
4D1D2
[ 0:
The theorem is proved. h
The graphical representations of GL, return rate, and
retail price are presented in Fig. 1a–c. The following
parameter values are used: a ¼ 300, b ¼ 0:5, cm ¼ $50,
r
T
m
T
r
T
m
T
prT
pmT
a b
c
Fig. 1 a GL in Scenarios MT, RT. b s in Scenarios MT, RT. c Retail price in Scenarios MT, RT
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k ¼ 1, cr ¼ $20, ws ¼ $5, a ¼ $10, d ¼ 0:6, q0 ¼ $30,
j ¼ 800, b 2 ð0:2; 0:4Þ, c 2 ð0; 0:5Þ, and q 2 ð0; 0:15Þ.
Note that GL, return rate, and retail price increase with
GL sensitivity (b) of consumers and incentive rate (c). If c
increases, then the manufacturer can invest more to
improve GL and used product return. It is expected that
CLSC members can receive higher profits under their own
leadership. The above results justify the facts. Investment
flexibility can allow product and process innovation that
helps to improve overall CLSC performance and generate
competitive advantages. Recently, Vozza (2018) reported
that an estimated 68 million Americans considered - per-
sonal, social, and environmental aspect during point of
purchase. Consequently, powerful retailers always want to
trade with higher-quality products and meet the quality
dimensions to maintain reputation. Therefore, the manu-
facturer may be obligated to produce greener products
under RS game. Return rate of used product is higher under
RS game. Indeed, retailers have better understanding the
importance of personalization and consumer’s buying
decisions due to their interaction opportunity. In many
emerging sector like food chain, electronic accessories,
retailers have emerged as the dominant players in many
parts of the world through marketing contracts exercise.
Therefore, retailer-dominated CLSC is beneficial in per-
spective of product quality and remanufacturing.
Optimal decisions under incentive Policy C
In this policy, the consumer directly receives the incentive
form the government. The profit functions for the retailer
and manufacturer in Scenario MC are obtained as follows:
pCrmðpCmÞ ¼ ðpCm  wCmÞða bðpCm  ðq0 þ qh
C
mÞÞ þ bh
C
mÞ
ð3Þ
pCmmðwCm; hCm; sCmÞ ¼ ðwCm  cmÞða bðpCm  ðq0 þ qhCmÞÞ þ bhCmÞ
þ ðcmdþ wsð1  dÞ  a crÞ
sCmða bðpCm  ðq0 þ qhCmÞÞ þ bhCmÞ
 jsCm
2  khCm
2
ð4Þ
If q ¼ 0, consumers receive fixed amount of incentive
whatever the GL of the product (Sinayi and Rasti-Barzoki
2018). However, the amount of incentive may proportional
with GL of the product such as Energy Star products which
directly influence purchase behavior of consumer. The
following two propositions represent the optimal decisions
in Scenarios MC and RC, respectively.
Proposition 3 Under MS game, optimal decisions in
Policy C are obtained as follows:
wCm ¼
ðaþ bq0kÞð4j bM2Þkþ ð4bkcmj ðbþ bqÞ2Þcmj
D3
;
pCm ¼
ðaþ bq0Þð6j bM2Þkþ ð2bk ðbþ bqÞ2Þcmj
D3
;
hCm ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞðbþ bqÞj
D3
; sCm ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞbMk
D3
;
pCrm ¼
4ða bðcm  q0ÞÞ2bk2j2
D3
2
;
pCmm ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞ2kj
D3
;QC ¼ 2ða bðcm  q0ÞÞbkj
D3
:
where D3 ¼ bkð8j bM2Þ  ðbþ bqÞ2j.
Proposition 4 Under RS game, optimal decisions in Policy
C are obtained as follows:
wCr ¼
ðaþ bðcm þ q0ÞÞð2j bM2Þkþ 2ð2bk ðbþ bqÞ2Þcmj
2D4
;
pCr ¼
ðaþ bq0Þðð6bk ðbþ bqÞ2Þj 2b2M2kÞ þ ð2bk ðbþ bqÞ2Þbcmj
2bD4
;
hCr ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞðbþ bqÞj
2D4
; sCr ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞbMk
2D4
;
pCrm ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞ2kj
2D4
;
pCmm ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞ2kj
4D4
;QC ¼ ða bðcm  q0ÞÞbkj
D4
:
where D4 ¼ bkð4j bM2Þ  ðbþ bqÞ2j.
Optimal solutions exist under Scenarios MC and RC if
Dl [ 0, l ¼ 3; 4. Derivations of optimal decisions in Sce-
narios MC and RC are similar to Scenarios MT and RT,
respectively. Therefore, we omitted the proofs. Govern-
ment incentives encourage the manufacturer to produce
product with a higher GL and invest more to collect used
products because
ohCm
oq ¼
ðabðcmq0ÞÞð8bjkþjðbþbqÞ2b2M2kÞbj
D3
2
[ 0, oh
C
r
oq ¼
ðabðcmq0ÞÞðjð4bkþðbþbqÞ2Þb2M2kÞbj
2D4
2 [ 0,
osCm
oq ¼
2ðabðcmq0ÞÞðbþbqÞb2Mjk
D3
2 [ 0, and
osCr
oq ¼
ðabðcmq0ÞÞðbþbqÞb2Mjk
D4
2
[ 0, respectively. Therefore, consumers always receive
products with a higher GL compared to no-incentive pol-
icy. Moreover, it stimulates recycling activity also. Addi-
tionally, CLSC members can sell more products under RS
game. Theorem 2 analyzes the optimal decisions in two
game structures under incentive Policy C.
Theorem 2 Under incentive Policy C,
(1) the GL of the product is higher in RS game
(2) the return rate is higher in RS game
(3) consumers need to pay more in MS game compared
to RS game if k[ ðbþbqÞ
2
2b
(4) the manufacturer and retailer receive higher profits
under their respective leadership.
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Proof The following inequalities ensure the proof:
hCr  h
C
m ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞðbþ bqÞðjðbþ bqÞ2 þ b2M2kÞj
2D3D4
[ 0
sCr  sCm ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞðjðbþ bqÞ
2 þ b2M2kÞbMk
2D3D4
[ 0
pCm  pCr ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞð2bk ðbþ bqÞ2Þðjðbþ bqÞ2 þ b2M2kÞj
2bD3D4
[ 0ifk[
ðbþ bqÞ2
2b
pCrr  pCrm ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞ
2ðD32 þ 8bjkD4Þjk
2D3D4
[ 0
pCmm  pCmr ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞ2ð3D3  4bjkÞjk
4D3D4
[ 0
The theorem is proved. h
The graphical representations of GL, return rate and
retail price are presented in Fig. 2a–c under incentive
Policy C. The parameter values remain unchanged.
It is intuitive that the investment opportunity for the manu-
facturer in producing green products or collecting used product
will increase with government incentive q, and above fig-
ures also demonstrate the facts. Theorems 1 and 2 demonstrate
that the manufacturer needs to produce product with higher GL
under RS game irrespective of incentive type. Although con-
sumers may need to pay mare under MS game, it does not
ensure to receive products with higher GL. Government
incentives encourage the manufacturer to improve product
quality and accelerate remanufacturing activities. This increa-
ses the overall quantity demanded. The nature of GL and used
product return rate under both incentive policies support the
fact. Next, we discuss the nature of optimal decisions under
influence of marketing and operational targets of a
manufacturer.
Managerial insights and discussion
First, we determine the CSk ¼ 1
2
ðp̂k  pkÞqk(k= MT, MC,
RT, and RC) to measure the outcome of incentive in the per-
spective product consumption (Xie 2016; Hong and Guo 2018),
where p̂k, pk
, and qk
, represent the retail price at which no
consumer will purchase the green product, optimal retail price,
and sales volume in Scenario k, respectively. On simplification,
the values of CSk are, respectively, obtained as follows:
CSMT ¼ b
2ða bcmÞ2ð1  cÞ2MðM þ 3aÞk2j
D1
2
CSMC ¼ ða bðcm þ q0ÞÞ
2
b2MðM þ 2aÞk2j
D3
2
CSRT ¼ 2b
3ða bcmÞ2ð1  cÞ2k2j2
D1
2
CSRC ¼ 2ða bðcm þ q0ÞÞ
2
b3j2k2
D3
2
Similarly, we compute EIk ¼ ðĥk  hkÞQk, where ĥk, hk,
and Qk
 represent the GL in presence of incentive, GL in
the absence of incentive, and the optimal sales volume
under the influence of government incentive (Hong and
Guo 2018). The values of EIk are obtained as follows:
EIMT ¼ 2b
2ða bcmÞ2bð1  cÞck2ð8j bM2Þj2
D1
2D5
EIMC ¼
2ða bðcm þ q0Þðða bcmÞðbð8j bM2Þkþðbþ bqÞbjÞqþ ðbþ bqÞD5q0Þb2j2k
D3
2D5
EIRT ¼ ðb
2ða bcmÞ2bð1  cÞcð4j bM2Þj2k2
2D2
2D6
EIRC ¼ aqðD4 þ jðbþ bqÞð2bþ bqÞÞ þ D6ðbþ bqÞq0 þ bcmqðD6  bbjqÞ
2D4
2D6
:
There are numerous issues that may discourage remanu-
facturing activities such as availability of robust remanu-
facturing technology, the perception of consumers about
remanufactured products, the compatibility issues related
to the replacement parts, processing cost, and time (Atasu
et al. 2013). On contrary, the manufacturers sometime face
substantial barrier related to high cost of environmental
technologies associated with new product manufacturing or
product upgradation and used product remanufacturing,
lack of perception in implementing complex environmental
management system, highly price-sensitive consumers, etc.
(Jabbour et al. 2016). Therefore, a comparative analysis is
necessary by considering operational perspectives of the
manufacturer.
Theorem 3 Irrespective of incentive type, if the manu-
facturer wants to keep GL unchanged under MS game,
then:
(1) the manufacturer always receives higher profits in
incentive Policy C, and the retailer receives higher
profits in incentive Policy C if c[ bqbþbq,
(2) the return rate is higher under incentive Policy C if
c[ bqbþbq,
(3) the CS satisfies CSMC [CSMT if c[ bqbþbq,
(4) the EI satisfies EIMC\EIMT if c 2 ð bqbþbq ;
bððabcmÞqþðbþbqÞq0Þ
ðabðcmq0ÞÞðbþbqÞ
Þ.
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 5.’’ h
Theorem 4 Irrespective of incentive type, if the manu-
facturer wants to keep GL unchanged under RS game,
then:
(1) both the manufacturer and retailer receive higher
profits in incentive Policy C,
(2) the return rate is greater under incentive Policy C if
c[ bqbþbq,
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(3) the CS satisfies CSRC [CSRT if c[ bqbþbq,
(4) the EI satisfies EIRC\EIRT if
c 2 bqbþbq ;
bððabcmÞqþðbþbqÞq0Þ
ðabðcmq0ÞÞðbþbqÞ
 
.
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 6.’’ h
In producing, marketing, and recycling green products,
financial and operational obstacles as well as consumer’s
sensitivity to green products may incite the manufacturer to
fix GL. Theorems 3 and 4 demonstrate that if c[ bqbþbq,
then CLSC members receive higher profits under Policy C.
Additionally, if the manufacturers select this policy, then it
will lead to higher CS. Game structures are unable to make
any impact on the optimal selection for the manufacturer.
However, preferences of the CLSC members are identical
under RS game. Overall, if the government organizations
directly stimulants consumers, then it will generate higher
profits for the CLSC members but not EI. However, if
c[/ ¼ bððabcmÞqþðbþbqÞq0Þðabðcmq0ÞÞðbþbqÞ and the manufacturer selects
incentive Policy C, then CLSC members not only receive
higher profits but represent themselves as an ambassador of
sustainability. If ck/, then the manufacturer should select
incentive Policy T. Therefore, our findings indicate that
under this circumstance the manufacturer needs to estimate
parameter values delicately for selecting incentive scheme.
Graphical representations of profits of CLSC members,
return rate, EI, and CS under MS and RS games are pre-
sented in supplementary file for numerical justification.
Customer recognition is one of the key factors influ-
encing demand of remanufacturing products. Additionally,
the manufacturer needs to integrate clean technology
related to recycling, overcome legislation restriction, hire
specialized labor, install facility for remanufacture, etc.
Therefore, the manufacturing may face operational barrier
if the volume of return product is too high (Govindan et al.
2016; Wei et al. 2015). Similarly, if the manufacturer is not
efficient enough in encouraging consumers to participate in
recycling activities, then also the remanufacturing activi-
ties are not profitable. Consequently, we determine the
characteristics of optimal decision when the manufacturer
decides to set a goal on return rate.
Theorem 5 Irrespective of incentive type, if the return rate
of used products remains uniform under MS game, then:
(1) the manufacturer receives higher profits in incentive
Policy C, whereas the profits for the retailer remain
equal,
r
C
m
C
r
C
m
C
prC
pmC
a b
c
Fig. 2 a GL in Scenarios MC, RC. b s in Scenarios MC, RC. c Retail price in Scenarios MC, RC
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(2) GL is higher in incentive Policy T,
(3) the CSs remain identical in both the incentive policies,
(4) the EI satisfies EIMC\EIMT .
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 7.’’ h
Theorem 6 Irrespective of incentive type, if the return rate
of used products remains uniform under RS game, then:
(1) both the manufacturer and retailer receive higher
profits in incentive Policy C,
(2) GL is higher in incentive Policy T,
(3) the CSs remain identical in both the incentive policies,
(4) the environmental improvement satisfies EIRC\EIRT .
Proof See ‘‘Appendix 8.’’ h
Theorems 5 and 6 demonstrate that whatever the values
of parameters, CLSC members always receive higher
profits in Policy C. It is noteworthy to mention that the GL
of the product is always less under that policy. Although
CS remains uniform, incentive Policy T can assure higher
EI. Consequently, profit-seeking motive of manufacturer
can allure both the manufacturer and retailer to deviate
from sustainability goals. Graphical representations of
profits of CLSC members, GL, EI, and CS are presented
under MS and RS game in supplementary document. If the
manufacturer faces some operations and financial bottle-
neck, then goals of government and CLSC members may
not be concurrent. Incentive may improve profits not GL or
EI. Consequently, a strict regulatory measure is necessary
along with incentive to cultivate an expectation of desirable
outcomes. This study also ravels that the internal dynamics
of power structure in a CLSC is a critical factor. A pow-
erful retailer can impede the manufacturer to trade with
products at lower GL.
Note that the ratios of the investment in used product
collection with total R&D investment for the manufacturer
(RI
j
i ; i ¼ M;R) under incentive Policy T in both MS and RS
games are uniform, and the corresponding ratios are
RITi ¼
CLTm
ð1cÞkhTm
2 ¼ CL
T
r
ð1cÞkhTr
2 ¼ b
2ð1cÞðMþ2aÞMk
b2j
. Similarly, one
can verify that the ratios of the investment in used col-
lection with total R&D investment for the manufacturer in
Scenarios MC and RC are uniform, and the corresponding
ratio is RICi ¼
CLCm
khCm
2 ¼ CL
C
r
khCr
2 ¼ b
2ðMþ2aÞMk
jðbþbqÞ2 . Therefore, the
ratios are independent from market potential (a) or constant
part of incentive (q0) received by consumers from the
government. One can observe that consumers’ sensitivity
with GL (b) and investment efficiency of the manufacturer
in improving return rate (j) are inversely proportional with
investment ratio. Results suggest that the consumer sensi-
tivity with GL discourages the manufacturer in investing
return rate. The results make sense, if the consumers are
sensitive with GL, then the manufacturer can improve
demand of the product directly by higher investment in
R&D. The graphical representations of ratios of investment
without and with consideration of targets of the manufac-
turer are presented in Fig. 3a and b.
Above figures suggest that the ratios of investment change
significantly if the manufacturer sets targets. The ratio is
minimum if the manufacturer sets a target on GL. In this
circumstance, the investment in improving return rate
becomes small. Overall, if the manufacturer does not set any
target, then the ratio is maximum and marketing goal is a key
factor in investment decision. Therefore, results are sensible.
Similarly, we compute total investment (TIi
j) for the
manufacturer in R&D and used product collection rate
under both policies and the following results are obtained:
TIm
T ¼ CLTm þ ð1  cÞkh
T
m
2 ¼ ða bcmÞ
2ð1  cÞb2kj2
D1
2
TIr
T ¼ CLTr þ ð1  cÞkh
T
r
2 ¼ ða bcmÞ
2ð1  cÞb2kj2
4D2
2
TIm
C ¼ CLCm þ kh
C
m
2 ¼ ða bðcm  q0ÞÞ
2ðbþ bqÞ2kj2
D3
2
TIr
C ¼ CLCr þ kh
C
r
2 ¼ ða bðcm  q0ÞÞ
2ðbþ bqÞ2kj2
4D4
2
The graphical representations of total amount of invest-
ments are presented in Fig. 4a and b.
Figure 4a and b also justify the real practice, a manu-
facturer needs to change investment pattern according to
marketing goals. If the manufacturer sets a target on GL,
then total investment under that circumstance is maximum
in Policy C. Direct monetary benefits can stimulate cog-
nitive control of the psychology behind consumers pur-
chase decisions in a preparatory manner. The potential
effect in demand can increase a manufacturer’s decision to
invest in R&D and used product collection. The results
demonstrate the fact. The above figures also demonstrate
that total investment is minimum in Policy T if the man-
ufacturer does not set any marketing goal. Overall, if
consumers are highly sensitive with green products, then
investment in R&D to improve GL is better investment
strategy for the manufacturer. Next, we analyze the
behavior of total amount of government incentive (GIi
j)
received by the manufacturer under incentive Policy C and
Policy T in two game structures. On simplification, the
following expressions are obtained:
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GIm
T ¼ ckhTm
2 ¼ ða bcmÞ
2b2ckj2
D1
2
GIr
T ¼ ckhTr
2 ¼ ða bcmÞ
2b2ckj2
4D2
2
GIm
C ¼ ðq0 þ qhCmÞða bðpCm  ðq0 þ qh
C
mÞÞ þ bh
C
mÞ
¼ 2ða bðcm  q0ÞÞðða bcmÞðbþ bqÞjqþ ðD3 þ bjqðbþ bqÞÞq0Þbkj
D3
2
GIr
C ¼ ðq0 þ qhCr Þða bðpCr  ðq0 þ qh
C
r ÞÞ þ bh
C
r Þ
¼ ða bðcm  q0ÞÞðða bcmÞðbþ bqÞjqþ ð2D4 þ bjqðbþ bqÞÞq0Þbkj
2D4
2
The graphical representations of total amount of govern-
ment incentives are presented in Fig. 5a and b.
One can observe that the marketing or operational goal
of the manufacturer directly affects the total amount of
incentive, and the amount is maximum if the manufacturer
sets a target on GL. Figure 5a is consistent with the
findings of Theorems 3 and 4. The GL is higher in incen-
tive Policy C, where the manufacturer receives maximum
support. However, the supports are relatively low without
any targets in Policy T. The total amount of incentive is
less in Policy T and in the absence of any target. Moreover,
the nature of incentive is correlated with game structures
and consumer sensitivity with GL. One can observe that the
total amount of incentive is less in RS game in Policy T
compared to Policy C when the manufacturer sets target on
used product collection. However, the reverse trend is
observed in MS game. Therefore, the total amount of
investment related to green manufacturing and used pro-
duct return is highly sensitive with the manufacturer’s
strategic intentions. Recently, Chu et al. (2018) conducted
an empirical study to investigate the effects of environ-
mental concern versus different government incentive
policies on the consumers adaptation of environment-
friendly cars (EFCs) in the USA, Germany, Japan, Korea,
and China. The authors found that government incentives
appear somewhat ineffective in encouraging the adoption
of EFCs for four countries, but it makes a significant
impact in China. This study also reveals that environmental
concern of consumers and the manufacturer’s intention are
the keys for the desired outcomes of an incentive program.
By comparing outcomes under two incentive policies, we
found that an appropriate selection and implementation are
crucial to achieve sustainability goal if the government or
the manufacturer has limited budget.
Summary and concluding remarks
This study investigates the interaction between two CLSCs
members under price- and GL-sensitive demand. Optimal
decisions along with CS and EI are compared under two
government incentive policies in perspective of obtaining a
decision support framework for green manufacturing and
recycling. The following outcomes are of managerial signif-
icance. Irrespective of the incentive schemes, the GL and
return rate are always greater under RS game. Consumers
need to pay more under MS game. Therefore, a shift of
market dynamics can excite the manufacturer to produce
greener products. Characteristics of CLSC are commonly
explored under MS game; consequently, it is necessary to
compare CLSC decisions under different game structures to
obtain impeccable knowledge about manufacturing and
recycling practices. If the manufacturer has options for
selecting incentive scheme, then operational and marketing
goals play a critical role for the outcomes. If the manufacturer
sets uniform GL and selects incentive Policy C or T based on
system parameters, CLSC members can receive higher profits
under both policies due to higher CS, product return, and EI.
However, if the manufacturer sets used product return goal,
then it initiates an awful situation. Whatever the parameter
values, the manufacturer receives higher profits under
incentive Policy C, but GL and EI are always less compared
to incentive Policy T. Although CS or profit of the retailer
remains invariant, there is a possibility that the CLSC
member can compromise their sustainability goals to receive
higher profits. It is found that the ratios of investment are also
sensitive to the manufacturer’s intention. The manufacturer
needs to reduce amount of investment significantly in
encouraging recycling activities, if the consumers sensitivity
Fig. 3 a Ratio of total investment in used product collection with total
R&D investment for the manufacturer under MS game in different
incentive policies. b Ratio of total investment in used product
collection with total R&D investment for the manufacturer under RS
game in different incentive policies
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is high with green products. Therefore, it is necessary to
explore the properties of CLSC under budgetary constraints.
Overall, the objective of CLSC members and government
organization may not be concurrent. Consequently, incentive
policies should be implemented under regulation to obtain a
desirable outcome in the perspective of green manufacturing
and recycling.
We consider a simple CLSC structure, which can be
extended in several directions. For example, one cannot
ignore the presence of third party to collect used products.
Consequently, we need to explore the nature of optimal
decision by comparing three different modes of collection
i.e., manufacturer, retailer, and third-party collection mode
(Saha et al. 2016). We assume that consumer cannot
identify the difference between the new and remanufac-
tured products. However, consumers often value the
remanufactured product less than the new product (Ferrer
and Swaminathan 2010). We restrict our analysis under
single-period formulation; therefore, one can extend this
analysis under two-period formulation (De Giovanni and
Zaccour 2014). The model can be formulated as a mixed-
integer programming problem to consider the effect of
logistic cost, transportation vehicle type and their capacity,
investment budget, capacity of facility, etc. (Ghezavati and
Beigi 2016; Shishebori and Babadi 2018; Rezaee et al.
2017), to obtain influence of government incentive
empirically in a CLSC network, because those costs make
significant impact on overall CLSC performance. We
consider and compare results under two incentive policies;
one can analyze incentives on remanufacturing activities or
the manufacturer’s target on the volume of recycled
products. Meanwhile, future research should also explore
the coordination contract design, such as revenue sharing
and cost sharing, and explore comparative outcomes.
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Appendix 1: Optimal decision in Scenario MT
The optimal solution for the retailer’s optimization prob-
lem is obtained by solving
opTrm
opTm
¼ a bð2pTm  wTmÞþ
bhTm ¼ 0. On simplification, pTm ¼
aþbwTmþbhTm
2b
. The profit
function for the retailer is concave as
o2pTrm
opTm
2 ¼ 2b\0.
Substituting the optimal response in Equation (2), the profit
function for the manufacture is obtained as follows:
Fig. 4 a Total investment (TI) for the manufacturer in used collection
and R&D under MS game in different incentive policies. b Total
investment (TI) for the manufacturer in used product collection and
R&D under RS game in different incentive policies
Fig. 5 a The total amount of government incentive under MS game in
different incentive policies. b The total amount of government
incentive under RS game in different incentive policies
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We solve the following first-order conditions simultane-
ously to obtain optimal decision:
opTmm
owTm
¼ aþ bhTm þ bðcm  2wTm  ðcmdþ wsð1  dÞ
 cr  aÞsTmÞ ¼ 0;
opTmm
osTm
¼ ða bwTm þ bh
T
mÞðcmdþ wsð1  dÞ  cr  aÞ
 4sTmj ¼ 0;
opTmm
ohTm
¼ bðwTm þ ðcmdþ wsð1  dÞ  cr  aÞsTm  cmÞ
 4ð1  cÞhTmk ¼ 0;
After solving, optimal decision are obtained as presented in
Proposition 1.
We compute Hessian matrix (HT ) for the manufacturer
profit function as follows:
HT ¼
o2pTmm
owTm
2
o2pTmm
owTmos
T
m
o2pTmm
owTmoh
T
m
o2pTmm
owTmos
T
m
o2pTmm
osTm
2
o2pTmm
osTmoh
T
m
o2pTmm
owTmoh
T
m
o2pTmm
osTmoh
T
m
o2pTmm
ohTm
2


¼
b  bM
2
b
2
 bM
2
 2j bM
2
b
2
bM
2
 2ð1  cÞk


Values of principal minors of above Hessian matrix are
HT1 ¼ b\0; HT2 ¼
bð8jbM2Þ
4
[ 0; and HT3 ¼
 bð1cÞkð8jbM
2Þb2j
2
\0, respectively, where M ¼ cmdþ
wsð1  dÞ  cr  a. Therefore, profit function for the
manufacturer is also concave if D1 ¼ bð1  cÞk
ð8j bM2Þ  b2j[ 0.
Appendix 2: Optimal decision in Scenario RT
The optimal decision for the manufacturer’s optimization
problem is obtained by solving following equation
simultaneously:
opTmr
owTr
¼ aþ bhTr þ bðcm  mTr  2wTr MsTr Þ ¼ 0;
opTmr
osTr
¼ ða bðmTr þ wTr Þ þ bh
T
r ÞM  2jsTr ¼ 0;
opTmr
ohTr
¼ bðwTr þMsTr  cmÞ  2ð1  cÞhTr k ¼ 0:
After solving, the following solution is obtained:
wTr ¼
ð2jbM2Þð2ðaþbðcmmTr ÞÞð1cÞkcmb2ÞbcmM2ðb22bð1cÞkÞ
2ðbð1cÞð4jbM2Þkb2jÞ ;
sTr ¼
bðabðcmþmTr ÞÞMð1cÞk
bð1cÞð4jbM2Þkb2j ; and h
T
r ¼
ðabðcmþmTr ÞÞbj
bð1cÞð4jbM2Þkb2j
We compute Hessian matrix (HT ) the retailers’s opti-
mization problem is obtained as follows:
HT ¼
o2pTmr
owTr
2
o2pTmr
owTr os
T
r
o2pTmr
owTr oh
T
r
o2pTmr
owTr os
T
r
o2pTmr
osTr
2
o2pTmr
osTr oh
T
r
o2pTmr
owTr oh
T
r
o2pTmr
osTr oh
T
r
o2pTmr
ohTr
2


¼
2b  bM b
bM  2j bM
b bM  2ð1  cÞk


The corresponding values of principal minors are
HT1 ¼ 2b\0; HT2 ¼ bð4j bM2Þ[ 0; and HT3 ¼
2ðbð1  cÞkð4j bM2Þ  b2jÞ, respectively. Therefore,
profit function for the manufacturer is concave if
D2 ¼ bð1  cÞkð4j bM2Þ  b2j[ 0.
Substituting the optimal response, the profit function for
the retailer is obtained as pTrrðmTr Þ ¼
2bmTr ðabðcmþmTr ÞÞð1cÞjk
bð1cÞð4jbM2Þkb2j .
Therefore, one needs to solve
opTr
omTr
¼ 2bðabðcmþ2m
T
r ÞÞð1cÞjk
bð1cÞð4jbM2Þkb2j ¼
0 to obtain optimal decision. On simplification, we obtain
mTr ¼ abcm2b . The profit function for the retailer is concave
as
o2pTr
omTr
2 ¼  4b
2ð1cÞjk
D2
\0. By using backward substitution,
we obtain the optimal decision as presented in Proposition
2.
pTmmðwTm; h
T
m; s
T
mÞ
¼ ða bw
T
m þ bhTmÞðwTm þ ðcmdþ wsð1  dÞ  cr  aÞsTm  cmÞ  2ð1  cÞh
T
m
2
k 2sTm
2j
2
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Appendix 3: Optimal decisions
in the absence of government incentive
Proposition C.1 Optimal decision in Scenario MN is
obtained as follows:
wNm ¼
ð4ðaþ bcmÞk cmb2Þj abM2k
D5
;
pNm ¼
ð2ð3aþ bcmÞk cmb2Þj abM2k
D5
;
hNm ¼
ða bcmÞbj
D5
; sNm ¼
bða bcmÞMk
D5
;
pNrm ¼
4bða bcmÞ2k2j2
D5
2
; pNmm ¼
ða bcmÞ2kj
D5
;
QTm ¼
2bða bcmÞkj
D5
;
where D5 ¼ bkð8j bM2Þ  b2j.
Proposition C.2 Optimal decision in Scenario RN is
obtained as follows:
wNr ¼
2ððaþ 3bcmÞk cmb2Þj ðaþ bcmÞbM2k
2D6
;
pNr ¼
að2bð3j bM2Þk b2jÞ þ bcmjð2bk b2Þ
2D6
;
hNr ¼
ða bcmÞbj
2D6
; sNr ¼
bða bcmÞMk
2D6
;
pNrr ¼
ða bcmÞ2kj
2D6
; pNmr ¼
ða bcmÞ2kj
4D6
;
QNr ¼
bða bcmÞkj
D6
:
where D6 ¼ bkð4j bM2Þ  b2j.
Appendix 4: Profit differences
with and without incentive
The following inequalities ensure that the profits of CLSC
member are always higher in the presence of incentives:
Above inequalities ensure the proof.
pTrm  pNrm ¼
ða bcmÞ2b2cj2k
D1D5
[ 0
pTmr  pNmr ¼
ða bcmÞ2b2cj2k
4D2D6
[ 0
pTrm  pNrm ¼
4bða bcmÞ2b2cj3k2ð2D1 þ b2cjÞ
D1
2D5
2
[ 0:
pTrr  pNrr ¼
ða bcmÞ2b2cj2k
2D2D6
[ 0
pCrm  pNrm ¼
bjkðða bcmÞ2jqð2bþ bqÞ þ 2ða bcmÞD5q0 þ bD5q20Þ
D3D5
[ 0
pCmr  pNmr ¼
bjkðða bcmÞ2jqð2bþ bqÞ þ 2ða bcmÞD6q0 þ bD6q20Þ
4D4D6
[ 0
pCrm  pNrm ¼
4b2j2k2ðða bcmÞjqð2bþ bqÞ þ D5q0Þðða bcmÞð2D5  bjqð2bþ bqÞÞ þ bD5q0Þ
D3D5
2
[ 0
pCrr  pNrr ¼
bjkðða bcmÞ2jqð2bþ bqÞ þ 2ða bcmÞD6q0 þ bD6q20Þ
2D4D6
[ 0
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Appendix 5: Proof of Theorem 3
The optimal GLs in Scenarios MT and MC are
hTm ¼
ðabcmÞbj
D1
and hCm ¼
ðabðcmq0ÞÞðbþbqÞj
D3
, respectively.
Therefore, GLs are equal if k ¼
ððabcmÞqbq0ÞðbþbqÞbj
ððabcmÞðbcbqð1cÞÞbðbþbqÞð1cÞq0Þð8jbM2Þ
ð¼ k1; sayÞ. Now,
the difference between profits of CLSC members, return
rate, CS and EI between Scenarios MT and MC are
obtained as follows:
The theorem is proved.
Appendix 6: Proof of Theorem 4
The optimal GLs in Scenarios RT and RC are
hTr ¼
ðabcmÞbj
2D2
and hCr ¼
ðabðcmq0ÞÞðbþbqÞj
2D4
, respectively;
and those are equal if k ¼
ððabcmÞqbq0ÞðbþbqÞbj
ððabcmÞðbcbqð1cÞÞbð1cÞðbþbqÞq0Þð4jbM2Þ
ð¼ k2; sayÞ. Con-
sequently, the difference between profits of CLSC mem-
bers, return rate, CS and EI between Scenarios RT and RC
are obtained as follows:
The theorem is proved.
pCmmjk¼k1  p
T
mmjk¼k1 ¼
ðða bcmÞq bq0Þðða bcmÞðbc bqð1  cÞÞ þ bbq0Þj
ð8j bM2Þððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ
[ 0
pCrmjk¼k1  p
T
rmjk¼k1 ¼
4ðða bcmÞq bq0Þ2ðb2  ðbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ2Þbj2
ð8j bM2Þ2ððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ2
[ 0if c[
bq
bþ bq
sCmjk¼k1  s
T
mjk¼k1 ¼
ðða bcmÞq bq0Þðbc bqð1  cÞÞbM
ð8j bM2Þððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ
[ 0if c[
bq
bþ bq
CSMCjk¼k1  CS
MT jk¼k1 ¼
2ðða bcmÞq bq0Þ2ðb2  ðbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ2Þb3j2
ð8j bM2Þ2ððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ2
[ 0if c[
bq
bþ bq
EIMT jk¼k1  EI
MCjk¼k1
¼ 2ðða bcmÞq bq0Þ
2ðða bcmÞðb ðbþ bqÞð1  cÞÞ  bðbþ bqÞð1  cÞq0Þðbþ bqÞðbð1  cÞq bcÞb2cj
ð8j bM2Þðða bcmÞðb2c bbð2  cÞq b2q2Þ þ bbcðbþ bqÞq0Þðb2  ðbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞÞ2
[ 0 if c 2 ð bq
bþ bq ;
bðða bcmÞqþ ðbþ bqÞq0Þ
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞðbþ bqÞ
Þ
pCmrjk¼k2  p
T
mrjk¼k2 ¼
ðða bcmÞq bq0Þðða bcmÞðbc bqð1  cÞÞ þ bbq0Þj
4ð4j bM2Þððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ
[ 0
pCrrjk¼k2  p
T
rrjk¼k2 ¼
ðða bcmÞq bq0Þðða bcmÞðbc bqð1  cÞÞ þ bbq0Þj
2ð4j bM2Þððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ
[ 0
sCr jk¼k2  s
T
r jk¼k2 ¼
ðða bcmÞq bq0Þðbc bqð1  cÞÞbM
2ð4j bM2Þððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ
[ 0if c[
bq
ðbþ bqÞ
CSRCjk¼k2  CS
RT jk¼k2 ¼
ðða bcmÞq bq0Þ2ðb2  ðbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ2Þb3j2
2ð4j bM2Þ2ððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ2
[ 0if c[
bq
ðbþ bqÞ
EIRT jk¼k2  EI
RCjk¼k2 ¼
ðða bcmÞq bq0Þ2ðða bcmÞðbc bqð1  cÞÞ  bðbþ bqÞð1  cÞq0Þðbþ bqÞðbc bð1  cÞqÞb2cj
2ðða bcmÞðb2c bbð2  cÞq b2q2Þ þ bbcðbþ bqÞq0Þð4j bM2Þððbþ bqÞ2ð1  cÞ  b2Þ2
[ 0if c 2 ð bq
bþ bq ;
bðða bcmÞqþ ðbþ bqÞq0Þ
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞðbþ bqÞ
Þ
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Appendix 7: Proof of Theorem 5
The return rate of used products from the consumers in
Scenarios MT and MC are sTm ¼
bðabcmÞð1cÞMk
D1
and
sCm ¼
ðabðcmþq0ÞÞbMk
D3
, respectively. Therefore, equality
holds if c ¼ bððabcmÞjqð2bþbqÞþbð8jbM
2Þkq0b2jq0Þ
ðabcmkq0ÞjðbþbqÞ2þb2ð8jbM2Þkq0
ð¼ c1; sayÞ.
Consequently, the following differences are obtained:
pCmm  pTmmjc¼c1 ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞbjkq0
D3
[ 0
pCrm  pTrmjc¼c1 ¼ 0
hTmjc¼c1  h
C
m ¼
bðða bcmÞjqðbþ bqÞ þ ðD5  bbjqÞq0Þ
bD3
[ 0
CSMC  CSMT jc¼c1 ¼ 0
EIMT jc¼c1  EI
MCj
¼ 2b
2jkða bðcm  q0ÞÞðða bcmÞjqðbþ bqÞ þ ðD5  bbjqÞq0Þ
bD3
2
[ 0
The theorem is proved.
Appendix 8: Proof of Theorem 6
The collection rate of used products in Scenarios RT
and RC will be uniform if c ¼
bððabcmÞjqð2bþbqÞþbð4jbM2Þkq0b2jq0Þ
ðabcmkq0ÞjðbþbqÞ2þb2ð4jbM2Þkq0
ð¼ c2; sayÞ. Conse-
quently, the following differences are obtained:
pCmr  pTmrjc¼c2 ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞbjkq0
4D4
[ 0
pCrr  pTrrjc¼c2 ¼
ða bðcm  q0ÞÞbjkq0
2D4
[ 0
hTr jc¼c2  h
C
r ¼
bðða bcmÞjqðbþ bqÞ þ ðD6  bbjqÞq0Þ
2bD4
[ 0
CSRT jc¼c2  CS
RC ¼ 0
EIRT jc¼c2  EI
RC ¼
b2jkða bðcm  q0ÞÞðða bcmÞjqðbþ bqÞ þ ðD6  bbjqÞq0Þ
2bD4
2
[ 0
The theorem is proved.
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